Risk Communication Barriers

Multi-hazard Early Warning System Design & Implementation Center (MHEWC): A Global Platform for Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS)-Supporting the Global South

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African Countries :

 Barriers to Last-Mile Early Warning Dissemination and Risk Communication in African Countries :

1.0 Overview of Indicative Barriers :

Barriers to modernization of risk communication dissemination channels in many African countries are deeply intertwined with prevailing governance structures and entrenched institutional mindsets, accountability, and no one is there to hold them accountable for taking the right initiatives.

Our observations noted that in many African countries, the most timely broadcasting of weather warnings and alerts is extremely fragmented and insufficient, with limited geographical coverage, and, due to cascading delays, relaying latency, and being inappropriate for reaching end users within minutes. They heavily depend on limited-coverage FM radio, satellite TV, WhatsApp groups, road shows, and the civil protection committee ( rural level). The warning/alerts broadcasting channels are commonly recognized as public and private broadcasting media, including radio, television, online radio, podcasts, and news outlets, as indispensable components of an integrated last-mile warning system. However, all those channels have limitations in geographic coverage and selected user groups (townships).

However, we noticed that AM Radio(Amplitude Modulation Radio) has been taken out in most African countries, knowing that how significant it is to reach every geographical pocket of the country and even beyond.   The AM Radio (pocket radio with battery, windup, and solar PV-powered) set is free of cost and operational, and the lowest-cost portable option for any individual in the country, particularly for dispersed settlements in hard-to-reach areas.  This raises a critical question: why should a proven, wide-area public-warning capability be withdrawn from operational?

The strategic importance of AM broadcasting for nationwide early warning cannot be overstated. High-power medium-wave transmitters can cover extensive geographical areas, while warnings can be received through affordable, portable, and battery-powered radios even in remote locations and during electricity, mobile-network, or internet disruptions. FM broadcasting remains highly valuable and generally provides better audio quality; however, its predominantly line-of-sight transmission normally has a more limited geographical range and can be significantly affected by terrain, physical obstructions, transmitter locations, and network density.

Although AM broadcasting is not immune to interference, fading, or other technical limitations, eliminating it may create serious warning-coverage gaps, particularly for remote, rural, border, coastal, and underserved communities. Governments should therefore retain, modernize, or restore AM broadcasting capacity where necessary, and other privately running FM radio, television, cell broadcast, SMS, satellite communications, internet platforms, sirens, and community-based networks can easily affiliate and broadcast to the last mile. Such a redundant, multi-channel approach is essential to ensure that authoritative warnings reach every person at risk, including the last mile, during both routine emergencies and catastrophic communication failures.

 

 

a) Why has AM Radio (Amplitude Modulation Radio) been taken out???

However, we noticed that AM Radio(Amplitude Modulation Radio) has been taken out in most African countries, knowing that how significant it is to reach every geographical pocket of the country and even beyond.   The AM Radio (pocket radio with battery, windup, and solar PV-powered) set is free of cost and operational, and the lowest-cost portable option for any individual in the country, particularly for dispersed settlements in hard-to-reach areas.  This raises a critical question: why should a proven, wide-area public-warning capability be withdrawn from operational?

The strategic importance of AM broadcasting for nationwide early warning cannot be overstated. High-power medium-wave transmitters can cover extensive geographical areas, while warnings can be received through affordable, portable, and battery-powered radios even in remote locations and during electricity, mobile-network, or internet disruptions.

In many African countries, AM broadcasting, particularly medium-wave services, has been reduced, neglected, or taken out of operation. This trend deserves urgent examination because AM broadcasting can provide an extensive geographic reach that is difficult or expensive to reproduce through a network consisting exclusively of FM transmitters.

High-power medium-wave AM transmitters can cover large territories, including dispersed settlements and areas located far from major cities. Warnings can be received through relatively inexpensive, portable radios powered by replaceable batteries, rechargeable batteries, hand-crank mechanisms, or small solar panels. Once a receiver has been acquired, listeners generally do not need to pay subscription charges, purchase mobile data, or maintain an internet connection to receive broadcasts.

AM reception can remain available during electricity failures, mobile-network outages, internet disruptions, and other communication breakdowns, provided that the transmitting station has resilient backup power and the receiving population has functioning radios. Unlike mobile networks, conventional broadcasting is a one-to-many service: millions of people can receive the same message simultaneously without overloading the transmission system.

This raises a critical public-policy question: why should a proven wide-area public-warning capability be withdrawn without first demonstrating that an equally reliable, affordable, resilient, and geographically inclusive alternative is operational?

Decisions concerning AM infrastructure should not be based solely on commercial audience trends, audio quality, or the operating costs of high-power transmitters. AM broadcasting used for public warning should be evaluated as part of a country’s life-safety and national-resilience infrastructure. Its social value becomes particularly important during catastrophic events when electricity, telecommunications, roads, and internet services may fail simultaneously.

b) Why subscribe to FM Radio Broadcasting even though it’s limited in extent??

We have noticed that FM radio is rapidly expanding in many African countries! It sounds good! FM broadcasting remains subject to some geographical coverage restrictions, and, in addition, it relies on subscriptions among African audiences, although it receives advertising incentives from commercial advertising.  Generally, FM provides better audio quality; however, its predominantly line-of-sight transmission normally has a more limited geographical range and can be significantly affected by terrain, physical obstructions, transmitter locations, and network density.

Although AM broadcasting is not immune to interference, fading, or other technical limitations, eliminating it may create serious warning-coverage gaps, particularly for remote, rural, border, coastal, and underserved communities. Governments should therefore retain, modernize, or restore AM broadcasting capacity where necessary, and other privately running FM radio, television, cell broadcast, SMS, satellite communications, internet platforms, sirens, and community-based networks can easily affiliate and broadcast to the last mile. Such a redundant, multi-channel approach is essential to ensure that authoritative warnings reach every person at risk, including the last mile, during both routine emergencies and catastrophic communication failures.

Although national circumstances vary considerably across Africa, recurring barriers to the modernization of risk communication and warning-dissemination systems are often deeply connected to prevailing governance arrangements, fragmented institutional responsibilities, entrenched organizational mindsets, inadequate investment, and weak accountability mechanisms. In some cases, there is no clear mechanism for holding the government accountable, and there are no cheap options for wider coverage of broadcast warnings.  Therefore, to date, there is a lack of governmental efforts to redefine stakeholder engagement; e.g., the institution needs to be clearly mandated or held accountable for ensuring that an authoritative warning reaches every person at risk in the shortest possible time.

Modernization is therefore not simply a matter of purchasing new technologies. It requires institutional reform, clear operational responsibilities, enforceable service standards, sustainable financing, interoperability, and a commitment to protecting all communities, including people living in remote, rural, coastal, border, mountainous, pastoral, and otherwise underserved areas.

c) Fragmented and Delayed Warning Dissemination:

 Our observations indicate that weather-warning and emergency-alert dissemination remains fragmented and insufficient in many African countries. Geographic coverage is often uneven, while the transmission of warnings may involve multiple institutional handovers, manual approvals, telephone calls, emails, messaging groups, and administrative clearances. These cascading procedures can create serious delays between the issuance of an official warning and its receipt by communities.

The central government , National Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Communication, and local governments are fragmented in agreeing on a very easy and one-stop solution to this problem: an integrated broadcasting network and communication system. International agencies are also not giving actionable advice.

Because of the terrain landscape and hydrometeorological multi-hazards (cloud-bursts, torrential rainfall, squally & gusty damaging winds, tornadoes, rapidly developing thunderstorms, hailstorms, tropical storms ) , they are occurring with very sudden onset. The rapidly evolving emergencies(even in midnight), such as flash floods, severe thunderstorms, tropical cyclones, storm surges, landslides, wildfires, or dam-related incidents, can cause life-threatening consequences and catastrophes even with a shorter delay. Now burning questions to policymakers: how can those disintegrated and fragmented, time-delay and latency-induced broadcasting and risk communication systems warn people in a few minutes to evacuate???

d) Limitations of the dissemination value chain :

The dissemination chain may depend heavily on limited-coverage FM radio, satellite television, WhatsApp groups, social media, roadshows, and civil-protection committees operating at the local or rural level. Each of these mechanisms has an important role, but none can independently guarantee nationwide, immediate, and inclusive warning coverage.

For example:

  • FM radio can provide excellent audio quality and strong local programming, but its coverage is influenced by transmitter power, terrain, physical obstructions, antenna locations, and the density of the transmission network.
  • Television can reach large audiences but normally requires electricity, reception equipment, and viewers to be watching when an emergency warning is issued.
  • WhatsApp and other social-media platforms depend on smartphones, mobile data, electricity, digital literacy, network availability, and people being connected to the appropriate groups. Information can also be delayed, altered, or circulated without verification.
  • SMS can reach many mobile subscribers, but delivery may be delayed during network congestion, and messages can fail to reach people without active mobile coverage or functioning handsets.
  • Satellite television and satellite communication services can support wide-area dissemination but may remain inaccessible to low-income households and communities without the necessary equipment or reliable power.
  • Roadshows are valuable for public awareness, preparedness education, and community engagement, but they are not suitable as the primary channel for issuing time-critical warnings.
  • Civil-protection committees and community volunteers are essential for translating warnings into local action, but they require reliable upstream communication, training, equipment, financing, and clearly defined operating procedures.
  • Online radio, podcasts, websites, and mobile applications can complement the warning system, but they depend on internet connectivity and are not always designed to interrupt users with urgent alerts.

These limitations demonstrate that public and private broadcasters, including radio, television, online platforms, news agencies, and community media, must be treated as interconnected components of an integrated national warning system rather than as separate or informal communication outlets.

2.0 Proposition for overcoming the barriers to Real-Time Forecasting and Warning Dissemination

 Establishing a robust, real-time forecasting and warning capability remains a major challenge for many national hydrometeorological services and disaster-management authorities. National risk-communication networks frequently fail to receive, process, and disseminate authoritative warnings within the limited time available before an emergency occurs.

A synchronized, interoperable, and integrated system must therefore be established across the entire warning value chain. This system should connect observation networks, forecasting centres, disaster-management authorities, emergency operations centres, local governments, broadcasters, telecommunications providers, media outlets, community organizations, and at-risk populations through clearly defined standard operating procedures.

The objective is to ensure that technically accurate, impact-based, and actionable forecasts and warnings reach exposed populations early enough for people to understand the danger, trust the information, and take appropriate protective action.

Solutions to Overcome the Barriers : 

 2.a) Automated Broadcaster Interruption and Multi-Channel Dissemination

Multi-hazard emergencies can develop at any time, including during the late-night and early-morning hours when forecasting offices, broadcasters, and local administrative institutions may be operating with limited personnel. National systems must therefore maintain 24-hour monitoring, forecasting, alerting, and dissemination capabilities.

AI- and machine-learning-assisted systems can continuously analyse meteorological, hydrological, oceanographic, geological, and environmental data; identify predefined danger thresholds; support the preparation of warning messages; and rapidly transmit alerts through an integrated national dissemination platform.

 

Once a warning has been validated and authorized under established institutional protocols, radio and television systems should be capable of automatically interrupting routine programming to broadcast the urgent message. This process should not be delayed by lengthy administrative approvals or repeated manual communication between institutions.

Official warnings should simultaneously be disseminated through:

  • AM, FM, shortwave, and community radio;
  • public and private television networks;
  • cell broadcast and SMS;
  • mobile applications and emergency push notifications;
  • satellite communication services;
  • websites, social media, and online news platforms;
  • sirens and public-address systems;
  • emergency call centres; and
  • local governments, civil-protection committees, and community-based networks.

AI should function as a decision-support and dissemination-acceleration mechanism. Final warning authority, accountability, and oversight must remain with legally designated national institutions, except where fully automated alerts are permitted under predefined thresholds, with alert-level triggers, validated rules, and formally approved standard operating procedures.

2.b) Real-Time Sensor-Based Data Processing and Situational-Awareness Intelligence and Automated national alerting hub and Common Alerting Protocol (CAP):

 National warning systems should integrate real-time data from automatic weather stations, weather radar, satellites, rain and river gauges, lightning-detection networks, ocean buoys, tide gauges, soil-moisture sensors, landslide-monitoring instruments, wildfire-detection systems, and other hazard-monitoring technologies. These scientific observations should be supplemented by verified ground-level reports from individuals, trained community volunteers, civil-protection committees, emergency responders, local governments, and other authorized sources. Community-generated reports should be geotagged, time-stamped, quality-controlled, and verified before being incorporated into operational decision-making.

An integrated AI  and machine-learning-enabled platform should automatically: collect and quality-control incoming data; and AI to generate CAP,  combine sensor observations with satellite, radar, forecasting, and community information; identify rapidly changing or abnormal conditions; compare observations against predefined warning thresholds; estimate the location, timing, intensity, and potential impacts of a hazard; generate maps, forecasts, decision-support products, and draft warning messages; recommend appropriate warning levels and protective actions; and distribute authorized alerts through the integrated risk-communication network.

2.c) Automated national alerting hub: A National Automated Alerting Hub processes data from forecasting agencies accessed via API; disaster-management authorities define threshold and role-based protocols, checking standing protocols with emergency operations centers, broadcasters, news outlets, telecommunications providers, and community networks and finally developing automated alerts (If multi-hazards impend at midnight). It should include a national warning-coverage map and a real-time geospatial portal displaying hazard locations, exposed populations, warning areas, communication coverage, evacuation routes, shelters, critical infrastructure, and reported impacts.

 

The platform should support location-specific and geofenced alerts(automated CAP), enabling warnings to be sent directly to people within threatened areas. Distinctive emergency tones, television and radio interruptions, cell-broadcast messages, mobile push notifications, sirens, and other attention-demanding mechanisms should be used to alert people even during midnight or early-morning emergencies. Such an integrated system would significantly reduce delays between hazard detection, warning authorization, dissemination, public reception, and protective action. It would transform fragmented institutional processes into a coordinated, accountable, and people-centered national early warning system.

 

2.d) Mandating Integrated AM and FM broadcasting for all users:

 There is a lack of AM radio systems in Africa that need to be centrally installed. There is an urgent need for the integration of broadcasters (AM, FM, Satellite TV, web Radio, Drone radio, podcasts, etc.). Those channels provide different but complementary advantages. FM broadcasting generally offers better audio quality and is highly effective for urban areas, towns, and local-language programming. However, FM signals are predominantly line-of-sight and normally cover a more limited geographic area. Mountainous terrain, tall buildings, dense vegetation, physical obstructions, transmitter locations, and inadequate network density can create coverage gaps where AM radio is suitable.

Countries should undertake evidence-based coverage assessments to install multiple relaying stations for wider  AM services.

2.e) National meteorological and hydrological services(NMHS)  organizations to play intermittent roles in supporting broadcasters to prepare impact bulletins and warnings at appropriate scale:

We know that, due to geographical, topographical, landscape setting, and soil condition, the hazard turns into a disaster with local context. The national central broadcasts need to disseminate the hazard forecast on a synoptic scale; then, ad hoc NMHS, the local government sector department, and NDMA need to interpret local warnings with the potential impact level, intensity, and frequency for those geographical areas.  

 

2.f) Warning Delivery Must Extend Beyond Message Transmission

 An effective last-mile warning system is not achieved merely when a message is broadcast. The warning must be: received by people in the threatened area;  communicated in languages and formats they understand; accessible to persons with disabilities, older people, children, and people with limited literacy; trusted as authoritative and credible; specific about the location, timing, severity, and expected impacts; clear about what people should do, where they should go, and when they should act; repeated and updated as conditions change; and connected to local preparedness, evacuation, shelter, health, rescue, and humanitarian-response arrangements.

NMHS, disaster-management authorities, broadcasters,   telecommunications regulators, mobile-network operators, local governments, humanitarian organizations, community leaders, and civil-society networks must therefore operate through a common warning architecture. The failure of one channel should automatically be compensated for by several others.

2.g) Establishing a Redundant Multi-Channel System :

 Governments should retain, modernize, or restore AM broadcasting capacity where it is necessary for national warning coverage. AM services should then be integrated with privately and publicly operated FM radio, community radio, television, cell broadcast, SMS, satellite communications, internet platforms, mobile applications, sirens, social media, public-address systems, emergency call centres, and community-based networks.

A modern national warning-dissemination system should include:

  1. Clear institutional authority and accountability: National legislation, policies, and standard operating procedures should identify who is authorized to issue warnings, who must disseminate them, how quickly each institution must act, and who is accountable when the system fails.
  2. A Common Alerting Protocol–enabled platform: Authoritative alerts should be produced in a standardized digital format, calculating the time-related factors and changes to be distributed simultaneously to broadcasters e.g, AM, FM, Satellite TV, Web FM Radio, webcast, podcast, mobile-network operators, emergency services(SMS/IVR, Cell broadcast),  government agencies, online platforms, and community networks.
  3. National warning-coverage mapping: Governments should regularly very the performance of the integrated system of  AM, FM, television, mobile, satellite, siren, and other channels. Regularly check  that the messages are targeting the audience with multilingual messages and understandability for the population; a regular feedback mechanism needs to be installed.
  4. Resilient communication infrastructure: Broadcasting facilities, transmission towers, emergency operations centres, and telecommunications systems should have backup generators, renewable-energy systems, battery storage, redundant links, spare equipment, and disaster-resistant installations.
  5. Affordable access to emergency radios: Battery-powered, solar-powered, and wind-up radio receivers should be made available to high-risk households, schools, health facilities, fishing communities, farmers, pastoralists, emergency shelters, community volunteers, and local authorities.
  6. Formal public-private agreements: Governments should establish binding arrangements with public, private, and community broadcasters so that official warnings are disseminated immediately, consistently, and without commercial barriers.
  7. Multilingual and accessible messaging: Warnings should be translated into relevant national and local languages and delivered through audio, text, visual, and accessible formats appropriate for different population groups.
  8. Community relay mechanisms: Local authorities, religious institutions, traditional leaders, volunteers, women’s organizations, youth groups, disability organizations, and civil-protection committees should be equipped to relay and explain warnings where electronic coverage remains limited.
  9. Testing and performance monitoring: Warning systems should be tested through regular drills and unannounced exercises. Performance should be measured through indicators such as dissemination time, geographic coverage, message accuracy, public understanding, accessibility, and the proportion of people who take appropriate action.

2.g) Strengthening Governance and Accountability :

 The largest barrier may not be a lack of technology but the absence of institutional responsibility for end-to-end delivery. A national meteorological service may consider its responsibility complete once it issues a forecast. A disaster-management authority may assume that local governments will distribute the warning. Broadcasters may wait for formal authorization, while local committees may not receive the message until the hazard has already arrived.

This fragmented approach must be replaced by a single coordinated system in which every institution understands its responsibilities, deadlines, escalation procedures, and backup arrangements. Warning-dissemination performance should be subject to independent review, public reporting, parliamentary or regulatory oversight, and corrective action.

Modernization programmes should also avoid focusing exclusively on advanced digital technologies. Smartphones, artificial intelligence, mobile applications, and social-media platforms can significantly improve warning precision and speed, but they cannot replace basic, resilient communication channels for people without electricity, mobile coverage, internet access, or digital devices. Technological modernization must be inclusive and must preserve proven systems that continue to provide strategic public value.

Summarized Recommendations:

African governments, WMO regional weather forum, Technical institutions, development partners and MHEWC  should undertake comprehensive national assessments of warning-generation and dissemination systems. These assessments should examine governance, institutional mandates, transmission latency, geographic coverage, technological interoperability, infrastructure resilience, public accessibility, community trust, and operational accountability.

Since  AM broadcasting can close critical warning gaps, it should be treated as part of national emergency infrastructure and integrated into a modern multi-channel architecture. The objective is not to return to an outdated, single-channel communication model. It is to combine the extensive reach and resilience of radio with the speed, targeting capabilities, and interactive features of contemporary communication technologies. No single dissemination channel can reach every person under every condition except a powerful AM radio station set up and operating as a central broadcaster. A resilient warning system must therefore be redundant by design. If mobile networks fail, radio should remain available. If electricity is interrupted, battery, solar, or wind-up-powered receivers should continue operating. If digital platforms become unavailable, broadcasters, sirens, emergency services, and community networks should carry the message. If one institution is delayed, automatic procedures should activate alternative pathways.

The ultimate measure of an early warning system is not the sophistication of its forecasts or the number of technologies it possesses. Its success is determined by whether every person at risk, including those at the last mile, receives (in the local language), understands, trusts, and acts upon an authoritative warning before the hazard causes avoidable loss of life.

The Multi-Hazard Early Warning System Design and Implementation Center (MHEWC) is intended to support African countries in assessing, restructuring, and modernizing their national broadcasting, warning dissemination, and risk communication systems. This support may include institutional assessments, communication-coverage audits, AM and FM broadcasting reviews, Common Alerting Protocol integration, multi-channel system design, standard operating procedures, capacity development, and national modernization roadmaps.

The responsibility of  MHEWC: 

The Multi-Hazard Early Warning System Design and Implementation Center (MHEWC) provides technical support to countries across the Global South to integrate national broadcasting networks, warning dissemination channels, and media outlets into effective last-mile early warning systems.

We welcome the opportunity to engage with African countries through technical discussions and consultations to review, restructure, and strengthen their existing systems. We would be pleased to arrange a remote Teams Meeting to discuss this initiative further.

© All rights reserved by Z  M  Sajjadul Islam, Advisor, Multi-Hazard Early Warning System Design and Implementation Center (MHEWC). 

Contact MHEWC

Z M Sajjadul Islam
Advisor, Multi-Hazard Early Warning System Design & Implementation Center (MHEWC)
Email: zmsajjad@gmail.com
WhatsApp: +88 01711 979179